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A China Reading List

Here’s a list of the reading I did while living in China. It’s hardly the most well-rounding but if you did all of it you would have a pretty good view of where China has come from in the last hundred years and where it is now. Ironically, in my cursory survey of contemporary scholarship I would say a real look at the opinions and lives of young urbanites is most lacking (Westerners are too obsessed with the rags to riches/state obstruction stories of the countryside).

Non-Fiction

Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China - Evan Osnos
China Airborne - James Fallows
Forgotten Ally: China’s World World II, 1937-1945 - Rana Mitter
Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse - Shelley Rigger
A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World - Rana Mitter
The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of Confucian Tradition - Daniel K. Gardner
Heart of Buddha, Heart of China: The Life of Tanxu, a Twentieth Century Monk - James Carter
The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity - Wang Hui
Buddhism in Chinese History - Arthur F. Wright
The World of Thought in Ancient China - Benjamin I. Schwartz
Dao De Jing: A Philosophical Translation - Roger T. Ames
Red Lights: The Lives of Sex Workers in Postsocialist China - Tiantian Zheng
The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land - Gardner Bovingdon
Confucius’ Analects With Selections from Traditional Commentaries - Hackett Publishing
China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society - Daniel A. Bell
Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea and the Hazards of World History - Alexander Barton Woodside
The Intellectual Foundations of China - Frederick W. Mote
From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia - Pankaj Mishra
The Struggle for Modern Tibet: The Autobiography of Tashi Tsering - Tashi Tsering
Oracle Bones: A Journey Between China’s Past and Present - Peter Hessler
Out of Mao’s Shadow: The Struggle for the Soul of a New China - Philip P. Pan
Tibet: A History - Sam Van Schaik
A History of China - Wolfram Eberhard
Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia - Thant Myint-U
Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century - Orville Schell

Fiction:

Crossings - Chuang Hua
The Real Story of Ah-Q and Other Tales of China - Lu Xun
Lust, Caution and Other Stories - Eileen Chang
Love in a Fallen City - Eileen Chang
Last Words from Montmartre - Qiu Miaojin
An Empty Room - Mu Xin

After The Fall

strangesubject:

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Written by Quinn Lester, reviewed by John Thomason

[Content warning: sexual assault, murder, violence against women]

If you’ve been on the internet at all this year then you may have noticed that a lot of people like talking about television, and in particular two TV shows have dominated discussion so far this year: True Detective and Game of Thrones. In terms of genre these two shows are very different. True Detective is a dark police thriller about murdered women, cults, and the presence of evil in the world. Game of Thrones is similarly dark but is set in a gritty fantasy world where rival families fight it out for domination beneath the shadow of a returning ancient evil. Just describing these shows it becomes obvious, that despite their cosmetic differences, both are dedicated to a bleak view of the world and investigating the violence of everyday life. Both shows also happen to be sexist, misogynistic, and delight in showing the torture and killing of women. Even before the show featured a graphic rape scene last week, Sady Doyle has written about the patriarchal view Game of Thrones has of women and the way they are reduced to be props for the desires, and violent impulses, of the men in the show. Many also wrote about True Detective’s troubling portrayal of women suffering abuse, even from a main character who is never really punished for his actions. In writing about the show Emily Nussbaum pointed how a lot of TV these days tries to be “serious” not through its actual story but by showing violence towards women. The more women suffer the more “serious” people seem to find a show. It was first from Nussbaum that I heard about the British-Irish series The Fall that aired last year but has not gotten the attention it deserves. It is a show that is actually serious, in both its content and themes, but instead of featuring patriarchal violence is about investigating the conditions that allow that violence to happen.

The Fall stars Gillian Anderson as Police Superintendent Stella Gibson who has been brought to Belfast to help hunt for a mysterious serial killer Paul Spector, played by Jamie Dornan. Set in a post-truce Northern Ireland there is the palpable lingering of violence in the air, of old wounds that have not yet begun to heal. The show tackles this most directly in questions about the effectiveness of the police force and how well it has overcome political fissures, but in general the mood is of a fallen world where violence can strike at any moment, whether that be from serial killers, corrupt police officers, or abusive husbands. At first glance many of the female characters we meet are independent women making their way in the world but it does not take long to see the ways the world is set up against them: Paul targets successful professional women for his crimes, female police officers are casually mocked by their own co-workers, and the self-evidently brilliant Gibson has to fight for every ounce of credibility she gets.

The Fall does many things right that so many shows still get wrong. It has compelling, three-dimensional female characters that also have serious relationships and conversations with other women. Patriarchy, sexual assault, and rape culture are all discussed in serious and responsible ways while also being seamlessly integrated into the concerns of the narrative. While half of the show’s time is spent on the male serial killer Paul it also consistently gives us Gibson’s perspective of the world and the challenges she faces. The real strength of the show, however, and what comes closest to offering a feminist version of the serial killer procedural is that it does not just focus on the crimes themselves. To put it bluntly the actual subject of the show is patriarchy and the gradations of violence that occur in a patriarchal world.

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Review I wrote of the incredible show The Fall, though I didn’t get to write enough about how fabulous Gillian Anderson is.

For my own reference I attempted to compile the most complete list of published books on speculative realism, object-oriented ontology, new materialisms, and associated work and I figured I would share it. I also include in this list works from feminist materialisms, because they are important for providing a fuller genealogy for contemporary research, and those authors that are harder to classify together but generally write on nihilism, pessimism, and eliminationism. For the moment I’ve left off Francois Laruelle, who is still very confusing to me, and accelerationist authors like Nick Land and McKenzie Wark. The tags are my own and don’t necessarily reflect how the authors self-identify.

Graham Harman – Object-Oriented Ontology

Tool Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (1993/2011)

Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (2011)

Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (2009)

Towards Speculative Realism: Essays and Lectures (2010)

Circus Philosophicus (2010)

The Prince and the Wolf: Harman and Latour at the LSE (2011)

Quentin Meillasoux: Philosophy in the Making (2011)

The Quadruple Object (2011)

Weird Realism: Lovecraft and Philosophy (2012)

Bells and Whistles: More Speculative Realism (2013)

Levi Bryant – Onticology/Machine-Oriented Ontology

The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, Edited with Nick Snricek and Graham Harman (2011)

The Democracy of Objects (2011)

Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media (2014)

Timothy Morton – OOO, Ecology

Ecology Without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (2009)

The Ecological Thought (2012)

Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality (2013)

Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World (2013)

Ian Bogost – OOO, Game Studies

Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing (2012)

Quentin Meillassoux – Speculative Materialism

After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (2009)

The Number and The Siren: A Decipherment of Mallarme’s Coup De Des (2012)

Ray Brassier – Eliminative Materialism

Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (2010)

Iain Hamilton Grant – Naturphilosophie

Philosophies of Nature After Schelling (2008)

Jane Bennett – Political Theory, Vitalism

Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2009)

Reza Negarestani – Eliminative Materialism, Theory-Novel

Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials (2008)

Ben Woodard – Naturphilosphie, Nihilism, Pessimism

Slime Dynamics (2012)

On an Ungrounded Earth: Towards a New Geophilosophy (2013)

Steven Shaviro – Film Studies, Process Thought

Without Criteria: Kant, Deleuze, Whitehead, and Aesthetics (2009)

William Connolly – Political Theory, Pluralism

A World of Becoming (2012)

The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism (2013)

Paul J. Ennis

Post-Continental Voices: Selected Interviews (2010)

Continental Realism (2011)

Adrian Johnston – Transcendental Materialism

Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism: The Outcome of Contemporary French Philosophy (2013)

Adventures in Transcendental Materialism: Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers (2014)

John Protevi – Deleuze, Science Studies

Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic (2009)

Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences (2013)

Eugene Thacker – Media Studies, Horror, Dark Vitalism

After Life (2010)

In the Dust of This Planet: Horror of Philosophy Vol. 1 (2011)

Thomas Ligotti – Horror, Nihilism, Anti-Natalism

The Conspiracy Against the Human Race: A Contrivance of Horror (2012)

Diana Coole and Samantha Frost – Political Theory, New Feminist Materialisms

New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2012)

Stacy Alaimo – New Feminist Materialisms

Ed. Material Feminisms (2013)

Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (2010)

Bruno Latour – Actor Network Theory

We Have Never Been Modern (2012)

Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2007)

An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (2013)

Adam S. Miller - Theology

Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and Object-Oriented Theology

Dylan Trigg – Phenomenology, Horror

The Aesthetics of Decay: Nothingness, Nostalgia, and the Absence of Reason (2006)

The Memory of Place: A Phenomenology of the Uncanny (2013)

The Thing: A Phenomenology of Horror (2014)

Tom Sparrow – Phenomenology, Horror

Levinas Unhinged (2013)

The End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the New Realism (2014)

Peter Gratton

Speculative Realism: Problems and Prospects (2014)

w/ Paul J. Ennis, The Meillassoux Dictionary (2014)

Tristan Garcia

Form and Object: A Treatise on Things (2014)

Elizabeth Grosz – New Material Feminisms, Deleuze

Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (1994)

The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and The Untimely (2004)

Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art (2011)

Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth (2012)

Donna Haraway – Cyborg Theory, New Feminist Materialisms

Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature

The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (2003)

When Species Meet (2013)

Rosi Braidotti – Nomad Theory, Deleuze, New Feminist Materialisms

Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics (2006)

Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2011)

Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (2013)

The Posthuman (2013)

Karen Barad – Agential Realism, New Feminist Materialisms

Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (2013)

Manuel DeLanda – Deleuze, Realism, Science Studies

A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History (2000)

A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (2006)

Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason (2011)

Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy (2013)

Isabelle Stengers – Process Thought

Thinking with Whitehead: A Free and Wild Creation of Concepts (2011)

Cosmopolitics I (2010)

Cosmopolitics II (2011)

Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin

New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies (2012)

For Every Norm You’ve Ever Cored

strangesubject:

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The problem with metafashion is that it’s difficult to discern what exactly it’s supposed to be saying. This is the hipster irony conundrum. Is that douchebag in the corner wearing a fedora out of a sincere appreciation of brimmed hatwear and the douche-y image that it projects or is he wearing it to douchily satirize the type of person who would sincerely wear a fedora? It’s unclear. The same problem is posed when normcore is understood as metafashion. Is it a protest against capitalist consumerism or a reinforcement of the normative forces of fashion as an arm of capitalism? Could it be both and, therefore, a form of lateral agency? Or is it just bullshit?

Normcore, New York Magazine proclaims, is a trend where young, urban 20-somethings dress down because they know that they’re, as the subtitle of the article proclaims, only one in 7 billion. A normcore wardrobe relies on simple t-shirts, sweat pants, and other clothes considered “mall clothes.” Think about your generic suburban mom or dad’s leisure clothes, and you’re close to normcore. Jerry Seinfeld has become normcore’s mascot, and Gap is doing business on normcore’s tails.

But spoiler alert: it’s bullshit. Cat Smith at The Style Con notes that clothing only allows you to “blend in” only when your body is already understood as normative. Race and class are central to the (il)legibility of normcore, even if Lauren Bans wants to make a joke of those implications by rickrolling people rather than providing analysis. Fashion is both statement and armor. Clothing sends signals about status and respectability. It is not a “waste” for the poor to spend money on luxury goods when we all know what luxury goods can symbolize. But even more, clothing can also be the difference someone giving you the benefit of the doubt and someone pulling a trigger — depending on how your body is perceived. All fashion has implications for our bodies and our survival. I wear a hoodie largely with impunity. Trayvon Martin and other young black men wear hoodies, and they get read as dangerous, violent, and bodies to be killed.

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On Uyghurs, Kunming, and the Xinjiang Question

strangesubject:

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Guest post by Quinn Lester, cross-posted on and adapted from Quinn’s blog

On March 1st eight Uyghurs, an ethnic minority located predominantly in Xinjiang province in northwest China, attacked a railway station in Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan province in the southwest, with knives and machetes. Ultimately 29 were killed, over a hundred wounded, and four of the assailants shot dead. This is the largest terrorist attack in recent Chinese history and the most prominent attack carried out by Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang, eclipsing fall’s suspected suicide bombing in Tiananmen Square. Who are the Uyghurs exactly and what would inspire such a violent attack in a place like Kunming, far from the coastal centers of power? Having lived in China for the last few months I have seen periodic references to the Uyghurs and their independence struggle against China, but for a better view I turned to Gardner Bovingdon’s 2010 book The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. It is a good primer on the Uyghurs, their grievances against China, and the form their struggle has taken. I want to highlight below some of the interesting facts I garnered from this book and how they shed light on the Kunming attack.

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Thanks to my friends at StrangeSubject for reposting my post on the Uyghurs’ struggles in China

Hannibal’s Feminist Take on Horror

sadybusiness:

So, I may not have talked about this, but I like this one show about a guy who eats people. Which show about a guy who eats people? Read on to find out! 

Anyway, here’s my (surprisingly long) two cents on Hannibal as a feminist filmmaking triumph, largely because you’re too fucking scared whilst watching it to notice how many plum roles are going to ladies and people of color, or how many Satan-worshiping rape gangs it’s refusing to include (cough, cough, rhymes with Blue Corrective, cough) so as to make effective horror that doesn’t rely on exploiting women. 

On Uyghurs, Kunming, and the Xinjiang Question

On March 1st eight Uyghurs, an ethnic minority located predominantly in Xinjiang province in northwest China, attacked a railway station in Kunming, the provincial capital of Yunnan province in the southwest, with knives and machetes. Ultimately 29 were killed, over a hundred wounded, and four of the assailants shot dead. This is the largest terrorist attack in recent Chinese history and the most prominent attack carried out by Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang. Who are the Uyghurs exactly and what would inspire such a violent attack in a place like Kunming, far from the coastal centers of power? Having lived in China for the last few months I have seen periodic references to the Uyghurs and their independence struggle against China, but for a better view I turned to Gardner Bovingdon’s 2010 book The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. It is a good primer on the Uyghurs, their grievances against China, and the form their struggle has taken. I want to highlight below some of the interesting facts I garnered from this book and how they shed light on the Kunming attack.

To summarize some of the main history, the province of Xinjiang was conquered in the late 18th century by the Qing empire, though full territorial control was always spotty up until 1949, with two briefly independent states also existing in the area in the 1940’s. When the Communist Party came to power in 1949 it also assumed control of Xinjiang, despite the majority of the residents being Uyghurs and resistant to being part of the Chinese state. Hardliners in the CCP saw Xinjiang as an integral part of China for material and ideological reasons that will be covered below, and as a buffer against the Soviet Union. Since 1949 the Party has officially adopted a roughly multiculturalist stance in Xinjiang, proclaiming that Uyghurs are an ethnic minority in China that has the right to its own culture and that China itself is made up of many peoples working together. This rhetoric, however, has covered up the actual colonialist policies that China has carried out in Xinjiang. Even more so than the rest of China, especially during the current reform era, the Party has been repressive in Xinjiang. Uyghurs are often excluded from positions of power in the Party except for token leaders, and thus de facto rule of what many Uyghurs consider their homeland is denied to them. Uyghurs are excluded from the most economically profitable industries in Xinjiang. Uyghur cultural and religious practices – most Uyghurs are Muslim – are also often prohibited or discouraged by the state, such as religious gatherings or Uyghur language learning. Finally, the Party has policies that encourage Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang, both to carry out economic tasks prohibited to Uyghurs and to dilute the Uyghur, eventually making them a minority in their own land. Various details of this picture have changed over the years, but often not for the better for Uyghurs, and the state has often gotten more oppressive since prominent Uyghur uprisings in 1990, 1997, and 2009.

As I stated above, there are material and ideological reasons for China’s continued hold on Xinjiang, or East Turkestan as it is called by Uyghur independence activists, and claims that it is an inviolable part of Chinese territory. Materially the area is home to enormous natural gas and oil reserves, important for fueling China’s economy and maintaining energy security. Xinjiang also opens up natural trade routes to the economies, and again energy supplies, of Central Asia. The area has also been ideal for nuclear testing in the past, which Uyghurs have often protested against. Ideologically the Party refuses to give up any territory, whether that is Xinjiang, Tibet, claims to Taiwan or the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. One reason is due to the lingering history of China’s “century of humiliation” from the First Opium War in the mid-nineteenth century until the founding of the PRC in 1949. The weakened Qing and Republican governments were often forced to give territorial concessions to foreign governments like the British, the French, Germans, and probably most insultingly the Japanese. The loss of any Chinese territory would be a terrible blow to the Party’s ideological legitimization of freeing China from colonial rule, even if that ironically warrants China acting as an imperial aggressor in Xinjiang and Tibet. From more recent history, many Party leaders are convinced that the loss of any territory would presage the collapse of the Party itself. This comes from the Chinese view of the dissolution of the USSR, where the breakaway countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are seen as part of Gorbachev’s reformist policies and one cause for the soviet’s own destruction.

These ideological factors make Chinese state actors particularly hard line and the Party has consistently refused to acknowledge any legitimacy to Uyghur claims for independence or greater autonomy, and a refusal to negotiate with Uyghur transnational groups. Both China and Uyghurs contest the actual history of Xinjiang/East Turkestan; the Chinese claim there has been a Han presence in the area going back a couple thousands years, while Uyghurs claim there have been several independent nations in the area in the past. The truth is kind of in-between; there was a Chinese presence briefly during the Han and Tang dynasties but mostly different Central Asian states. The truth isn’t really useful here though, as modern claims to a nation-state often hinge on the idea of a single people who have lived in an area in perpetuity, a historically very modern idea that is linked to the origins of territory in 16th century Europe, as Stuart Elden excellently shows in his recent The Birth of Territory.

Since 1949 there have been several prominent waves of transnational organizing by Uyghurs living outside of China. In the fifties through the eighties much of this activity was located in Turkey with the permission of sympathetic Pan-Turkists in the government. Uyghur activists often had a difficult time calling attention to their cause, however, as China enjoyed a lot of leeway as an anti-colonial icon in Africa and Asia. The breakup of the USSR and the emerging Central Asian Turkic states created a lot of hope among Uyghurs that the time was ready for independence, an idea that China also feared. Early on Central Asian states, with large populations of Uyghurs having lived in these countries for years, were sympathetic and allowed Uyghur groups to organize. Unfortunately these Uyghur groups still relied on the benevolence of their host states. As time went on in the 90’s and these states had more pressing concerns in starting up their economies, leaders were more than willing to make sweet deals with Beijing in return for kicking out or pulling the plug on Uyghur groups and activists. The center of Uyghur organizing then moved to the developed West in Europe and America, as groups like the World Uyghur Congress emerged to try and claim one voice and legitimate representation of the Uyghur Diaspora.

Another interesting reason for this turn to the West was a perception in the 90’s, that feels like a faint memory now, that humanitarian intervention on the side of minority peoples was a legitimate action. When Uyghurs viewed the cases in Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo they saw examples of the West willing to act and both they and Party leaders did not think it unlikely that NATO or the UN would find reason to intervene on the side of the Uyghurs. Of course, as in many things, 9/11 changed the international calculus. Beijing quickly moved to highlight any violence in Xinjiang, not as separatist, but as Islamic terrorism. The Bush administration, in exchange for China’s assistance in the War on Terror, was willing to accept this interpretation, but not to the degree China wanted. In 2002 the US State Department placed the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) on its terrorist watch list, despite the group’s rather insignificant existence up to that date. This move did not fully satisfy China, who wanted all Uyghur groups listed as terrorists, but this did not stop them from proclaiming to domestic audiences that all Uyghur groups were also terrorist groups. This dynamic has continued in the last decade with any anti-state activities by Uyghurs in Xinjiang being labeled as inspired by Islamic terrorism and outside agitators, regardless of the political, economic, and cultural grievances and motivations behind Uyghur actions.

This brings us to the Kunming attack of March 1st. Early reports followed this pattern of labeling the attack as jihadist and inspired by Islamic terrorism, with potential linkages to violent Uyghur groups, though no official group has claimed responsibility. Beijing has an interest in portraying the attack as not only terrorist, which in its execution it was, but as also Islamic and part of a nefarious conspiracy by “separatist leaders” that deligitmizes any claims to independence or autonomy by actual Uyghurs in Xinjiang/East Turkestan. Further reports have complicated this picture however. Other evidence suggests that the eight Uyghurs involved in the attack had fled from Xinjiang to Yunnan with the intention of crossing the border to Laos as refugees. When the Chinese police crack downed on Uyghur activity and closed this route, however, these eight Uyghurs became trapped in Kunming. Furthermore, the police then arrested some of the family members and spouses connected to the eight Uyghurs, and placed them on a most wanted list even before the March 1st attack. Their precarious position may have inspired the eight Uyghurs to carry out a last desperate attack and would explain the crudeness of the knives and tactics involved. Far from being part of an organized jihadist cabal, the eight Uyghurs may have been the perverse outcome of China’s own harsh security measures.

This account is also more consistent with the lack of widespread Islamic jihadist influence in Xinjiang. There certainly does seem to be a rise in recent years of jihadist-influenced rhetoric but nothing on the level of Islamic movements like Hezbollah or Al-Qaeda. One reason for this lack of widespread jihadist influence may be the success of China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang. It is incredibly hard for information to get into the region with China invested in blocking radio waves and the internet. There is also little history of locally-inspired Islamist organizing or participation in Pan-Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or the case of Pre-Revolutionary Iran. The most popular and successful transnational Uyghur organizations, such as the World Uyghur Congress, are also secular in outlook and work to actively counter China’s professed links between Uyghur violence and Islamic terrorism. Any increase in the influence of Islamist views in Xinjiang are probably linked to the severe crackdown on civil society, which leaves only religious spaces and groups as sites for Uyghurs to gather and articulate their political grievances.

Much of the rhetoric of Uyghur organizing seems to have followed the language of anti-colonial nationalist movements, when it sought support from Non-aligned states like Turkey and the immediately post-Soviet states of Central Asia, or the international human rights rhetoric of the UN and minority peoples. As such efforts have continually failed to improve the situation on the ground, and as China has become even more intransigent, it is not unsurprising if the language of jihadist and Islamist inspired terrorism becomes more prominent, though it is unlikely such actions would do more than inspire even more repressive measures in Xinjiang/East Turkestan. As I hope I have shown the “Xinjiang Question” is intimately tied up in Chinese domestic and international politics, and only dramatic changes in the Party and its policies, or intense international pressure that sees through China’s distortions of Uyghur demands, are likely to bring any betterment to Uyghurs in the near future. Even more so than the Tibetans, who at least have an internationally recognized charismatic leader in the Dalai Llama, the future for the Uyghurs does not look like a very hopeful.

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